In a market there is a single firm that produces a unique product and can manipulate the price P(Q) by changing its output Q to maximise its profit. Suppose the consumers have a linear aggregated inverse demand function: P subscript D left parenthesis Q right parenthesis equals a minus b Q, and the cost function of this single firm is C left parenthesis Q right parenthesis equals c Q. Suppose another firm joins the market and produces the same product, and compete on price with the first firm. Both have the same cost function C left parenthesis Q right parenthesis equals c Q. Both firms independently and simultaneously make decisions. What are the new market-clearing price and quantity supplied by the first firm?
Answer: Price and Quantity Supplied by the First Firm in a Market with Two Competitors When there is a single firm in the market producing a unique product, it can manipulate the price P(Q) by changing its output Q in